



June 24, 2010

Ocean Protection Council  
1330 Broadway, 13<sup>th</sup> Floor  
Oakland, CA 94612-2530

**Re: “Evaluating Alternatives for Decommissioning California’s Offshore Oil and Gas Platforms”**

Dear Honorable Council members:

The following comments are submitted by the Environmental Defense Center (EDC) in response to the report on platform decommissioning prepared under the direction of the California Ocean Science Trust (OST). The EDC is a public interest environmental law firm that protects and enhances the environment through education, advocacy and legal action. We have worked on offshore oil and gas development issues since our inception in 1977, and have worked on platform decommissioning issues since 1996, when four platforms were proposed for decommissioning offshore Summerland (the Chevron “4H” project). The EDC was invited to a stakeholder process in 2007 to help define the scope of the platform decommissioning report.

During the stakeholder process we were under the impression that the purpose of the report was to answer questions and respond to concerns that had been raised when the Legislature had deliberated proposals to establish a rigs-to-reefs program in California. Three separate bills were rejected, due to concerns regarding safety, liability, and environmental issues. We are deeply disappointed to find out that these issues remain unresolved, and yet a “final” report is being presented to the state. In fact, the report now states that the purpose of the study was not to provide any new information or analysis, but rather to synthesize existing information. Given the many remaining data gaps identified by the report and the stakeholders, and the potential for the report to be used by decision-makers, we believe that it is critical that the state require a complete analysis before accepting the report as final.

We are also concerned about the process by which the report has been prepared and finalized. The OST appointed an Expert Advisory Committee (EAC) comprised of agencies and individuals with expertise in the issues to be addressed in the report. However, the comments of the EAC are confidential, despite the fact that some of the committee members are willing to share their comments with the public. The EAC members we have contacted have not yet reviewed the final report or provided comments thereon. Given their unique expertise, input from the EAC is critical information to be provided to decision-makers as well as to the public.

The importance of this report cannot be overstated. The Legislature is considering another rigs-to-reefs bill (AB 2503), which specifically references this report. We believe that the report should not be finalized until all issues are addressed. Therefore, we recommend the following action by the OPC:

- (1) Direct the OST to provide a process for public review and comment on the report.
- (2) Request EAC review and comment on the report.
- (3) Determine whether the report answers the questions raised during the stakeholder process.
- (4) Direct the OST to return to the OPC after responding to the public and EAC comments.

## **Background**

Beginning with the 4H project, and continuing our work in response to three separate bills proposing to amend state law to establish a rigs-to-reefs program, we have gained extensive experience with platform decommissioning issues. We were invited by then-Secretary of Resources Mike Chrisman to participate on a stakeholder group in 2007, with the purpose of identifying unresolved issues pertaining to platform decommissioning. At that time we expressed the need for more information to determine the ecological implications of a rigs-to-reefs program, the potential environmental impacts that may result if platforms are not removed from the ocean environment, as well as various issues relating to safety, liability, and precedent. (See attached scoping letter dated June 21, 2007.) It was our understanding that the purpose of the decommissioning study was to answer some of these questions so that decision-making would be adequately informed.

Unfortunately, this analysis did not occur. Instead, the consultant gathered existing information and summarized it in a report. Several critical issues remain unresolved, as noted below.

In addition, we believe that the report contains key misstatements and misrepresentations. We submitted a formal request to have an opportunity for public and agency comment on a draft version of the report, but our request was denied. (See attached letter dated March 15, 2010.) In light of the importance of having a complete,

accurate report, we respectfully request that you accept comments on this report and direct any revisions, corrections or additions as necessary to ensure a fair, balanced, and complete report for use by the public and decision-makers.

### **The Information in the Report is Incomplete**

Section 5.5 (“Data gaps”) presents an impressive list of missing information that reveals the inadequacies of the report. This list includes many items that were identified as needing analysis in 2007, during the scoping for the report. Many of these issues must be addressed before the report is considered complete, including but not limited to the following:

- Evaluating the overall effect platform communities have on the regional ecosystem and regional populations of fish.
- Determining habitat value and biological productivity at individual platforms. Currently only 8 of the 27 individual platforms (approximately 30%) have adequate data for modeling biological productivity. The study relies on two studies that examine a total of three platforms to make the general claim that juvenile rockfish are larger and have higher densities on platforms than on natural reefs. This generalization is improper and cannot be applied to other platforms that have not been studied.
- Analyzing the effect on fish assemblages of partially removing platform structures.
- Assessing the impact of allowing fishing at the platforms, as may be required under federal law.
- Analyzing the pollution effects caused by leaving contaminated shell and debris mounds in the ocean.
- Analyzing how a rigs-to-reefs program will affect proposals for new oil and gas development (by reducing costs and liabilities).
- Determining applicant costs of permitting and decommissioning.
- Determining state costs of management, monitoring, maintenance, enforcement, and liability insurance.
- Determining consistency of a rigs-to-reef plan with the state’s existing artificial reef program.

### **The Report fails to address the Data Gaps in its Analysis**

We are also concerned about how these data gaps are addressed in the report. While the report acknowledges that a variety of data gaps limit the full evaluation of impacts across all platforms for the different decommission options, they not fully discussed or integrated throughout the report.

### *Marine Resources*

For example, the data gaps relating to marine resources are not disclosed or discussed within Section 5.3.1, which deals with marine resources. Instead, the data gaps are revealed 80 pages later, in Section 5.5 (“Data gaps”). This section identifies data gaps in the following areas: platforms as reef habitat, platforms as refugia, and platform fish communities (Section 5.5, p. 162). For each of these areas the report acknowledges that data for individual platforms is missing. In fact the report mentions that some platforms do not have *any* fish monitoring data, and other platforms are missing complete data on fish size and distribution across the different depth zones (Section 5.5 pg 162). However, none of these data gaps are disclosed within the section discussing marine resources. Thus, while reading Section 5.3 the reader has the perception that current research has been conducted on many (or all) of the platforms.

This perception is far from the truth because, as discussed above, only two studies have examined 3 of the 27 platforms to compare fish size and density at natural reefs and platforms. Furthermore only 8 of the 27 individual platforms (approximately 30%) have adequate data for modeling biological productivity (Section 5.3.1.3, p. 94). Research by Love, et al. 2000<sup>1</sup>, 2003<sup>2</sup> and 2007<sup>3</sup> demonstrates that, of the platforms that have been studied, fish assemblages, size, and abundance vary from platform to platform. Thus, it is imperative that relevant data be collected at each platform to accurately determine whether or not each platform serves as reef habitat, refugia, and contributes to the stock and production of regional fish communities. Full disclosure of this information is lacking in Section 5.3. As a result this section leaves the reader with the impression that broad statements such as “These communities are similar to those on natural reefs but have greater densities of fish, and larger individual sizes for many species, particularly mussels, sea stars, and rockfish” apply for all platforms.

*Section 5.3 in the report should be revised to reflect the fact that not all platforms have been studied; thus, any assessment of platforms as reef habitat, refugia, and fish communities needs to be conducted for each platform. The report should disclose when only limited studies have been done.*

Another concern raised by EDC is the data gap in evaluating the overall effect platform communities have on the regional ecosystem and regional fish populations. The UC Marine Council report, “Ecological Issues Relating to Decommissioning of

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<sup>1</sup> Love, M.S., Caselle, J.E. and Snook, L. 2000. Fish assemblages around seven oil platforms in the Santa Barbara Channel area. *Fish Bulletin*. 98:96-117.

<sup>2</sup> Love, M.S., Schroeder, D.M., & Nishimoto, M.M. 2003. The ecological role of oil and gas production platforms and natural outcrops on fishes in Southern and Central California: a synthesis of information. U. S. Department of the Interior, U. S. Geological Survey, Biological Resources Division, Seattle, Washington, 98104, OCS Study MMS 2003-032.

<sup>3</sup> Love, M.S., Brothers, E., Schroeder, D.M., and Lenarz, W.H. 2007. Ecological performance of young-of-the-year blue rockfish (*Sebastes Mystinus*) associated with oil platforms and natural reefs in California as measured by daily growth rates. *Bulletin of Marine Science*. 80(1):147-157.

California's Offshore Production Platform"<sup>4</sup> found that "despite the fact that platforms can harbor abundant marine life, **it is the platform's contribution to regional stocks of species that is the crucial metric for evaluating its ecological impact.**" (Emphasis added.)

The report acknowledges that "data gaps prevent quantitative comparison of platform production to that in other communities and ecosystems in southern California, or any rigorous estimate of the overall contribution of platform communities to the regional ecosystem." (See Executive Summary. p. xxi.) EDC firmly believes this is an important question that still requires further analysis.

The report also fails to adequately address invasive (exotic) species that can be found on platforms. Invasive plants and animals are considered a major threat to aquatic ecosystems today because they can reduce the number and abundance of native species, alter the structure of native habitat, and negatively affect ecosystem processes.<sup>5</sup> Unfortunately, the report contains very little discussion about the threats invasive species can have on marine resources and ecosystems. In addition, the discussion about invasive species is incomplete as the report is not clear about how many platforms have been examined for invasive species, how many of these platforms contain invasive species, the density cover of invasives at infested platforms, and the potential for dispersal and interaction with native species.

*The report should be revised to contain a more balanced discussion about invasive exotic species. In addition, the report should disclose which platforms have been examined for invasive species, how many of these platforms contain invasive species, the density cover of invasive species at infested platforms, and the potential for dispersal and interaction with native species.*

### Costs

Another example of missing data relates to costs. The authors of the report openly admit that they had no way of accurately estimating the costs of maintaining, administrating, and monitoring a rigs-to-reef program, stating on page 156 that they are "unable to develop quantitative estimates of these costs except for cathodic protection." The report admits that a monitoring program would likely be needed as part of a California rigs-to-reefs program and offered as a comparative example the artificial reef program in the Gulf of Mexico. According to the report, Louisiana has spent roughly \$1 million on maintenance, administration and monitoring of its program over its lifetime (7 years), while the program generates roughly \$5 million each year in shared costs savings. However, the report quickly admits the comparison is weak, given the multitude of

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<sup>4</sup> Holbrook, S.J., Ambrose, R.F., Botsford, L., Carr, M.H., Raimondi, P.T. and Tegner, M.J. 2000. Ecological Issues Related to Decommissioning of California's Offshore Production Platforms. Select Scientific Advisory Committee on Decommissioning. University of California.

<sup>5</sup> Page, H.M., Dugan, J.E., Culver, C.S., Hoestery, J.C., 2006. Exotic Invertebrate Species on Offshore Oil Platform. Marine Ecology Progress Series. Vol. 325: 101-107.

differences between the two environs. The report goes on to say, on page 165, that programmatic practices are not yet set into law, so the costs of managing a rigs-to-reefs program would ultimately depend on the actions and policy decisions of the state and other involved stakeholders. The program would likely require expanded commitment from the California Department of Fish and Game (report at p. 198).

There is no mention of issuing fishing or other permits, nor any quantification of pollutant containment costs. Some information can be found on shell mound removal costs in the 4-H draft EIR, but the report admits that that information is highly inconsistent and inaccurate.

### **The Report is Biased and Misleading**

A fundamental example of bias is found in the introductory statement regarding the history of platform decommissioning offshore California. The report includes repeated references to the fact that prior decommissioning efforts included proposals for conversion to artificial reefs, and that such proposals were not implemented. (Report at pp. 7, 9, 11-12.) Notably, the report fails to explain *why* these “initial proposals” were rejected and agencies required complete removal of the platforms. These proposals were rejected because of concerns regarding environmental impacts, safety, liability and inconsistency with the state’s artificial reef guidelines. The report should be revised to explain *why* these proposals were rejected, and the fact that additional analysis was requested to address the concerns raised by the public and decision-makers.

The comparative analysis of the two decommissioning options also reveals a pervasive bias on the part of the authors. First, the analysis does not adequately consider short-term vs. long-term impacts. For example, the analysis does not compare the short-term environmental impacts associated with decommissioning activities vs. the long-term environmental impacts of leaving toxic and contaminated structures and debris at sea.

Second, the report repeatedly cites the impacts of explosives despite the fact that such use is admittedly “not likely.”

Another example of bias is evident in the treatment of impacts to fisheries. In the Gulf of Mexico, artificial reefs programs are used to provide fishing hot spots. Converting platforms to artificial reefs offshore California will likely have a similar effect, thereby causing a potential negative effect to regional fisheries. The report acknowledges that “Platforms converted to artificial reefs could be subject to fishing pressure that would reduce the fish populations remaining after decommissioning,” and states that it may be infeasible to protect these areas. Nevertheless, the report cites to a stated “willingness” by sport fishing groups to accept some restrictions on fishing. This statement by some current fishers has no binding effect on other fishers, now or in the future. Instead, these sites will most likely be magnets for fishing, with a potential adverse effect on local fisheries.

Furthermore, the report overlooks data gaps identified in Section 5.5 and overstates scientific findings about platform communities and biological productivity, resulting in misleading assumptions regarding this important issue. For example, Section 5.3.1.1 of the report states “individuals of several species are large and occur at higher densities on platforms compared to natural reefs, possibly because of lower fishing pressure on platform populations (Love et al. 2003, Love et al. 2007).” This statement leads a reader to assume that all platforms have higher densities of fish. Review of the scientific literature demonstrates that this question has only been examined for three of the 27 platforms. The limited number of studies on three platforms, and the variability between platforms, does not lend itself to applying this statement for all platforms.

For example, studies by Love et al. (2003) compared fish population at one natural reef and one platform, platform Hidalgo.<sup>6</sup> While this research showed that several species were larger and occurred at higher densities, the study only examined one platform (Hidalgo). Additionally, the same study also found that some fishes, such as pink seaperch, shortspine combfish, pygmy, squarespot, and yellowtail rockfishes, were more abundant at natural reefs when compared to platforms.<sup>7</sup> As another example, research by Love et al. (2007) had similar findings to research conducted in 2003, but again only examined fish populations at two platforms (platforms Irene and Holly). Neither of these reports suggests that all platforms have higher densities of fish. In fact, both of the studies by Love et al. are careful to suggest that some (not all) platforms may have higher densities and more abundance of some fish. With only limited research on three platforms, the current scientific findings are still inadequate to apply broad, misleading statements to all platforms. In order to truly examine this issue additionally studies would be needed for each platform.

*The report must be revised to reflect the fact that when comparing fish size and density between natural reefs and platforms only 3 of the 27 platforms have been studied, and in some cases natural reefs support greater fish abundance. Misleading statements suggesting that all platforms have large fish and higher densities of fish should be removed.*

## **The Report Contains Misinformation**

The report contains incorrect information regarding the legal liabilities facing the state if a rigs-to-reefs program is established. For example, the Executive Summary Table ES.1 states that “All options shown, with one exception, are legally allowable under existing law.” This statement is completely false. In fact, as the report itself

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<sup>6</sup> Love, M.S., Schroeder, D.M., & Nishimoto, M.M. 2003. The ecological role of oil and gas production platforms and natural outcrops on fishes in Southern and Central California: a synthesis of information. U. S. Department of the Interior, U. S. Geological Survey, Biological Resources Division, Seattle, Washington, 98104, OCS Study MMS 2003-032.

<sup>7</sup> Love, M.S., Brothers, E., Schroeder, D.M., and Lenarz, W.H. 2007. Ecological performance of young-of-the-year blue rockfish (*Sebastes Mystinus*) associated with oil platforms and natural reefs in California as measured by daily growth rates. *Bulletin of Marine Science*. 80(1):147-157.

acknowledges, current law requires complete removal of platforms.<sup>8</sup> In addition, Chapter 6.0 is replete with misinformation concerned the legal implications for the state, and misrepresents existing federal law (see discussion below).

In addition, the report states that the Community Environmental Council (CEC) proposed a wave energy project for Nuevo's Platform Irene. This statement is not accurate. In fact, CEC was supporting a research project, but not a commercial project and definitely not a project that would endure beyond the production life of the platform. Thus, the project was not a "decommissioning" project at all.

### **The Decision Model is Deficient due to the Lack of Critical Data**

We are concerned with the PLATFORM model that was developed to support the report. The model is missing critical data making it a deficient tool for evaluating decommissioning alternatives. Of the 19 model components discussed, the report identifies 14 components that are missing data and/or have data gaps (Section 5.5, pg 159-166). In many cases the model contains only placeholders until the data can be collected in the future. For example, placeholders are identified for the following model components: employment and economic impacts, air emissions, non-market value of non-consumptive diving, ecosystem value, economic value of recreation fishing, non market value of recreational fishing, desirability as fishing sites, and programmatic costs. In addition, the report identifies data gaps for information on platforms as reef habitat, refugia, and fish communities. These data gaps significantly reduce the ability of the model to provide an accurate representation of the decommissioning options.

*As there are substantial data gaps, we recommend that these data gaps be filled before the model is available for the public and decision makers.*

### **The Report Misrepresents the State's Potential Liability**

The report is fundamentally flawed in its presentation of ownership and liability issues. Chapter 6.0 of the report must be completely written to reflect the current requirements of the law.

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<sup>8</sup> See Memorandum to California Ocean and Coastal Community from Skyli McAfee, June 8, 2010: "Under the current regulatory framework, federal and state leases require complete removal of any installed facilities upon decommissioning. Consideration of any option other than full removal would require changes in state legislation;" report at p. xxii: "The partial removal option would necessarily trigger a complex legal and regulatory process that would require new state legislation..."; p. xxiii: "California currently cannot accept ownership of an artificial reef located in federal waters. The partial removal and artificial reefing option [] would therefore require new state enabling legislation..." "the partial removal option would require new state legislation to allow the state to accept ownership of platforms in federal waters;" Introduction, p. 1: "Existing offshore oil and gas leases require lessees in both state and federal waters to completely remove the production facility (i.e., the platform, including jacket, drilling rig, conductors, and all infrastructure and utilities) and to restore the seafloor to its pre-platform condition when the facility is no longer producing oil and gas."

As noted in the report, 23 of the 24 platforms that may be included in a rigs-to-reefs program are located in federal jurisdiction. For such platforms the law is clear: the state must assume title and liability. The report misleads the public, the state legislature and potential decision-makers by asserting that the state could transfer ownership to a third party, and by failing to accurately disclose the state's potential liability. Fortunately, the liability issue has been addressed in great detail by the Legislative Counsel of California, as discussed below.

### *Ownership*

The report presents a completely inaccurate and misleading discussion of ownership (and hence liability) issues. MMS regulations provide:

The Regional Supervisor may grant a departure from the requirement to remove a platform or other facility by approving partial structure removal or toppling in place for conversion to an artificial reef or other use if you meet the following conditions: (a) The structure becomes part of a State artificial reef program, and the responsible State agency acquires a permit from the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers and accepts title and liability for the structure; and (b) You satisfy any U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) navigational requirements for the structure.

(30 CFR §250.1730, emphasis added.)

Throughout Chapter 6, the report incorrectly states that the state could transfer ownership (and liability) to a third party. Only in a few places does the report admit that current federal law does not allow such a transfer (e.g., 6.1.1.2, Table 6.3). For the most part, however, the report discusses several options that are simply not legally feasible.<sup>9</sup>

As a particularly egregious example, the report states that the decommissioned platforms could be transferred to the Channel Islands National Marine Sanctuary (CINMS)! This statement is ludicrous. First, the platforms are not located within the jurisdiction of the CINMS. Second, the platforms may violate current CINMS policies and regulations, such as those prohibiting alterations of the seabed. As a further example of bias, the report includes an extensive discussion of transfer of ownership to the

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<sup>9</sup> The authors may be mistakenly relying on the artificial reef programs in other states, which allow other entities to own and manage the reefs. However, these laws and programs are quite different from the "rigs-to-reefs" program being contemplated offshore California. For example, some Gulf of Mexico states have adopted artificial reef laws, but these laws are not focused on platform decommissioning (although they may accept platform components as part of a reef structure) and are instead intended to comply with the National Fishing Enhancement Act. Those laws are quite different from the proposal in California, which is not to develop an artificial reef program (we already have an artificial reef program) but rather to allow platforms to be decommissioned in place. This "rigs-to-reefs" proposal must comply, not only with the National Fishing Enhancement Act, but also with the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (OCSLA) and its regulations, which require complete removal of platforms unless the state accepts title and liability. The laws from the other states do not reference OCSLA at all, and were not enacted to allow a platform to be left in place and converted to an artificial reef.

CINMS despite the fact that the CINMS is not interested, the platforms are not located within CINMS boundaries, and such transfer is not allowed under federal law.

### *Liability*

As noted above, the law requires states to assume liability for platforms that are not completely removed. The report completely misses the mark and misrepresents the state's potential liability. For example, Section 6.2.2.2 ("Liability on OCS Lands") omits *any* reference to the one regulation that addresses rigs-to-reefs liability, 30 C.F.R. §250.1730. This regulation requires that the state accept title *and liability* for abandoned platforms. The bias in the report is unmistakable and irreprehensible.

The issue of state liability was analyzed in great detail by the Legislative Counsel of California in 2001, in response to SB 1 (attached hereto).<sup>10</sup> The Counsel found that the state would be liable for civil penalties under the National Fishing Enhancement Act of 1984 if any permit requirements are violated. The Counsel also found that the state would be liable for claims arising from a dangerous condition on its property. In the case of an abandoned platform, the Counsel found that the state would likely be found to have constructive knowledge that an abandoned platform creates a dangerous condition; the question then would be whether the injury was reasonably foreseeable and if the state had taken sufficient action to protect against injury.

The report is inaccurate in two significant respects. First, the report discusses several means of reducing or eliminating state liability that are simply not legal. Although Table 6.3 reveals that there is no legal basis for these theories, they are nevertheless presented as possible solutions in the text of the report.<sup>11</sup> The report must be revised to clearly point out that these mechanisms are not legally allowed.

Second, the report contains incomplete, and thus misleading, information. For example, the report identifies indemnification as a possible mechanism for protecting the state from liability without disclosing the legal limitations on indemnification. (6.2.4.7) The Legislative Counsel's opinion discussed this issue in great detail and analyzed the limitations on indemnification as a tool to protect the state. The opinion points out that the state would retain liability for claims if the state (a) acts negligently, or fails to perform an act it has agreed to perform; (b) knowingly violates a condition of its federal permit (e.g. fails to adequately maintain the site in a safe manner); or (c) has actual or constructive knowledge of a dangerous condition and fails to protect against the

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<sup>10</sup> Legislative Counsel of California, Decommissioned Oil Platforms (S.B. 1) - #14137, June 18, 2001, attached hereto.

<sup>11</sup> For example, the Report incorrectly states that MMS and the state could provide an incentive for operators to "continue to share liability." (6.2.4.1.) MMS regulations simply do not allow the operator to share liability; instead, the regulations specifically *require* the state to assume liability. (30 C.F.R. §250.1730) The Report notes that "Such an arrangement, though possible in principle, has not been attempted in other artificial reef programs." That is because the law specifically prohibits such an arrangement.

condition. As such, the mere existence of an indemnification agreement does not mean that the state will not retain some measure of liability.

### *Management and Maintenance*

Again, the report minimizes the role and responsibility of the state by stating that the state could transfer ownership and thereby avoid direct involvement in management activities. (6.4) This statement, and all that flows therefrom, must be deleted.

*In sum, Chapter 6 must be overhauled and re-written to: (1) correctly represent federal law that requires states to assume title and liability for abandoned platforms, and (2) disclose the state's potential liability for accidents that occur at abandoned platform sites.*

### **The Report Understates Safety Concerns**

Safety issues remain a concern and are understated with respect to the discussion about leaving shell mounds and platforms in place. While the report mentions the risk to trawlers and longline fishermen and details the possible toxic contamination that could result if shell mounds are left in place, it does not offer a full discussion about the potential safety concerns. When the 4-H platforms were decommissioned, at least four commercial fishermen filed claims after snagging gear on the remaining debris mounds. The state initially required Chevron to mark the mounds with buoys, but the effort was a failure. Eventually, Chevron equipped commercial fishers in the area with GPS equipment to help them avoid the hazards created by the mounds. However, to this day it is unclear whether fishers in the future will be provided with such equipment, and how the public at large will be protected from these safety hazards. The report makes no mention of this situation and does not clarify how the state will deal with the safety issues if shell mounds are left in place.

In regard to safety concerns with partial removal of the decommissioned platform, the report mentions potential impacts to the commercial shipping industry, and indicates that trawlers and other fishermen will have to avoid the area (report at pp. 132-133). Similar to the concerns outlined above, it is unclear how the state will deal with the safety concern of having unmarked structures below the surface of the ocean. Thus, safety issues still remain a concern that has not been adequately addressed in the report.

### **Conclusion**

The OPC should direct OST to accept comments from the public, the Expert Advisory Committee, governmental agencies and stakeholders. It is critical that the information presented in the report be complete, accurate, and unbiased. Given that no platforms will be ready for decommissioning until 2015 at the earliest, there is time to receive input on the report and complete the job.

Thank you for your consideration of these comments.

Sincerely,



Linda Krop,  
Chief Counsel



Kristi Birney Rieman,  
Marine Conservation Analyst

Atts: Scoping letter from EDC to California Resources Agency, June 21, 2007  
Letter from EDC to OPC, March 15, 2010  
Legislative Counsel of California Opinion to Senator Jack O'Connell regarding  
Decommissioned Oil Platforms (SB 1) - #14137, June 18, 2001